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The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion 
during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis†
By Steven Ongena, Alexander Popov, and Neeltje Van Horen*
Using proprietary data on banks’ monthly securities holdings, we 
show that during the European sovereign debt crisis, domestic banks 
in fiscally stressed countries were considerably more likely than for-
eign banks to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds 
during months when the government needed to roll over a relatively 
large amount of maturing debt. This result cannot be explained by risk 
shifting, carry trading, or regulatory compliance. Domestic banks that 
received government support, are small, or with weaker balance sheets 
were particularly susceptible to “moral suasion,” while governance of 
banks played less of a role. (JEL D72, E62, G21, G28, H11, H63).
Between the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2013, domestic sover-eign bond holdings of euro area banks’ increased from about 2 percent to more 
than 5 percent of total assets (Figure 1). This increase was largely driven by banks in 
countries under fiscal stress, namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (here-
after “stressed countries” or “GIIPS”), whose relative holdings of domestic sovereign 
bonds tripled during this period (Figure 2). Crucially, while initially both domes-
tic and foreign banks in these countries were increasing their holdings of domestic 
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sovereign debt, after the start of the sovereign debt crisis in May 2010 domestic 
banks’ holdings continued rising at an even faster pace—reaching 9 percent of total 
bank assets—while foreign banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign debt declined and 
returned to a level predating the start of the global financial crisis (Figure 3).
This development has led both academics and policymakers to speculate that the 
rapidly increasing exposure of domestic banks in stressed countries to their sover-
eign was at least in part the result of “moral suasion,” whereby governments under 
fiscal stress pressure their banks to purchase additional amounts of domestic sover-
eign bonds because market demand is weak. The need to do so stems from the fact 
that the government’s inability to roll over its debt would damage its credibility and 
push sovereign bond yields up, raising debt refinancing costs.1 In response, banks 
may choose to respond to this pressure if they are locked in a long-term relation-
ship with the government where it is implicitly understood that current favors are 
reciprocated in the future, or because they feel it is their “moral” or “patriotic” duty 
to help the government in times of fiscal stress. Furthermore, an undersubscribed 
1 For example, after the undersubscribed auction for UK government bonds (gilts) on March 25, 2009, gilt 
prices slumped, the UK pound weakened against the US dollar and the euro, the opposition accused the government 
of losing control of public finances, and media commentators said the gilt failure further undermined the Prime 
Minister’s reputation for economic competence (“Alarm as government debt auction fails,” The Guardian, March 
25, 2009 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/mar/25/uk-economic-rescue-in-crisis).
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Figure 1. Domestic and Foreign Sovereign Bond Holdings: All Euro Area Banks
Notes: Average holdings of domestic and foreign sovereign bonds, divided by total assets, for 207 banks in 11 euro 
area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain) for the period September 2007–September 2012.
Source: IBSI
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 auction would imply higher sovereign spreads. This would directly translate into 
higher funding costs for banks, giving them another incentive to cooperate.
It is, however, still an open question whether moral suasion indeed took place 
during the European sovereign debt crisis. While a number of recent papers pres-
ent evidence consistent with this idea (e.g., Battistini, Pagano, and Simonelli 2014; 
Acharya and Steffen 2015; Horváth, Huizinga, and Ioannidou 2015; De Marco and 
Macchiavelli 2016; Altavilla, Pagano, and Simonelli 2017; Ohls 2017; and Becker 
and Ivashina 2018), it is intrinsically difficult to tightly identify the “moral suasion” 
channel and to separate it from other mechanisms leading domestic banks to pur-
chase domestic sovereign bonds in times of fiscal stress, such as risk shifting.
In this paper, we introduce a novel identification strategy which—in combination 
with a novel high-frequency dataset—allows us for the first time to convincingly 
identify the moral suasion channel. The previous literature typically identifies moral 
suasion by differentiating among banks depending on the extent of government 
control (e.g., state ownership) and by examining how this margin influences their 
behavior. Our identification strategy relies instead not only on exploiting differences 
between banks in their perceived likelihood to respond to pressure from the govern-
ment but adds another layer of identification by also exploiting  month-on-month 
fluctuations in the amount of sovereign debt that is maturing and therefore needs 
to be refinanced during times of severe fiscal stress. Adding this additional layer is 
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Figure 2. Domestic Sovereign Bond Holdings: Stressed versus Non-stressed Countries
Notes: Average holdings of domestic and foreign sovereign bonds, divided by total assets, for 207 banks in 11 euro 
area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain) for the period September 2007–September 2012. 
Source: IBSI
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critical to cleanly distinguish moral suasion from other drivers behind the increased 
demand for domestic sovereign debt during times of fiscal stress.
We find that during the acute phase of the sovereign debt crisis, domestic banks 
(that are arguably more susceptible to “moral suasion” by their own government) 
were substantially more likely to purchase domestically issued sovereign debt than 
foreign banks during months when the government had to roll over a relatively large 
amount of sovereign debt. This divergence in behavior for these two groups of banks 
did not take place outside of the period of the sovereign debt crisis. This effect is 
not only statistically significant but also economically relevant. During months with 
relatively higher government refinancing need, and compared with foreign banks, 
domestic banks increased their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds by 7.1 per-
centage points, corresponding to 0.46 sample standard deviations.
Exploiting differences between domestic banks, we also find that the effect is par-
ticularly strong for banks that received government support in the past, as well as for 
banks that were smaller, less well capitalized, and had a lower ratio of liquid assets 
to total assets. We do not find that state ownership or political affiliation matters. 
This suggests that moral suasion is not so much the result of a natural consequence 
of the governance relationship between banks and governments, but is driven by 
weaker banks that either owe the government a favor, or are trying to get on good 
terms with their government in anticipation of future assistance.
Our identification strategy exploits three typical features of sovereign bond mar-
kets in advanced countries. First, the main determinant of newly issued sovereign 
debt is the amount of maturing sovereign debt. Second, the amount of maturing 
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Figure 3. Domestic Sovereign Bond Holdings: Domestic versus Foreign Banks in Stressed Countries
Notes: Average holdings of domestic sovereign bonds, divided by total assets, for 46 domestic banks and 14  foreign 
banks in five stressed euro area countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) for the period September 
2007–September 2012. 
Source: IBSI
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 sovereign debt is strappingly predetermined because it is the outcome of choices 
typically made many years ago by previous governments. Third, the amount of 
maturing debt varies greatly on a month-on-month basis.2 This month-on-month 
variation is present in all countries and characterizes sovereign debt markets before, 
during, and in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis (see Figure 4).3
Therefore, the first building block of our identification strategy is the conjecture 
that during the sovereign debt crisis, and in months when the amount of maturing 
debt is relatively high, the government has a more pressing need to sway banks to 
purchase domestic sovereign bonds. Importantly, such month-on-month fluctuations 
in the government’s needs to roll over maturing debt can be viewed as a source of 
plausibly exogenous variation in the need of the government to find investors for 
the debt it needs to place and hence, its urgency to exert moral suasion. Because the 
amount of maturing debt is predetermined, it is also exogenous to current economic 
conditions, as well as to banks’ current demand for domestic sovereign debt.
The second step in our identification strategy exploits the idea (as others in the 
literature have done) that some banks are more likely to be swayed by the domestic 
government than others. This difference is most obvious when comparing domes-
tic and foreign banks. Domestic banks are more likely to be swayed than foreign 
banks because domestic banks have more to lose in terms of funding costs if an 
auction should fail, as their funding costs are more closely tied to that of the sover-
eign compared to the funding costs of foreign banks present in that same country. 
Furthermore, they are more likely, at some point, to need assistance from the gov-
ernment and are more vulnerable to explicit and implicit threats if they refuse to 
cooperate (Romans 1966, Reinhart and Sbrancia 2015). Finally, they are also more 
likely to feel a moral obligation or patriotic duty toward their government.4
Our identification strategy thus relies on assessing the differences in net pur-
chases of domestic sovereign debt between “high-need” and “low-need” months 
during a period of fiscal stress for domestic banks (the treatment group) relative 
to foreign banks (the control group). We define a high-need month to be a month 
in which the total amount of maturing debt is above the country-specific median 
for the applicable sample period. We focus on Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain during the acute phase of the sovereign crisis for each respective country. Our 
hypothesis is that if a moral suasion channel is operational, domestic banks will be 
more likely than foreign banks to purchase domestic sovereign bonds during high-
need months, while these two types of banks should not behave differently during 
low-need months.
Taking this empirical strategy to the data requires a bank-level dataset that ful-
fills two criteria: changes in banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign bonds—as well 
as various shocks to banks’ balance sheets—need to be observed with a monthly 
 frequency, and there needs to be substantial variation in bank ownership allowing 
2 For example, during the height of the crisis, €62.7 billion worth of Italian debt matured in September 2011, 
but only €15.7 billion in October 2011.
3 Data on maturing debt come from the Eurosystem Securities Database.
4 We later differentiate, within the group of domestic banks, between banks that are under the influence of the 
government and those that are not, as well as between weak and strong banks, in order to examine which type of 
banks are more likely to be morally swayed by their government.
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Panel A. Maturing debt by month, Greece 
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
20
09
:01
 
20
09
:0
3 
20
09
:0
5 
20
09
:0
7 
20
09
:0
9 
20
09
:11
 
20
10
:01
 
20
10
:0
3 
20
10
:0
5 
20
10
:0
7 
20
10
:0
9 
20
10
:11
 
20
11
:01
 
20
11
:0
3 
20
11
:0
5 
20
11
:0
7 
20
11
:0
9 
20
11
:11
 
20
12
:01
 
20
12
:0
3 
20
12
:0
5 
20
12
:0
7 
20
12
:0
9 
Panel B. Maturing debt by month, Ireland 
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
20
09
:01
 
20
09
:0
3 
20
09
:0
5 
20
09
:0
7 
20
09
:0
9 
20
09
:11
 
20
10
:01
 
20
10
:0
3 
20
10
:0
5 
20
10
:0
7 
20
10
:0
9 
20
10
:11
 
20
11
:01
 
20
11
:0
3 
20
11
:0
5 
20
11
:0
7 
20
11
:0
9 
20
11
:11
 
20
12
:01
 
20
12
:0
3 
20
12
:0
5 
20
12
:0
7 
20
12
:0
9 
Panel C. Maturing debt by month, Italy 
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Panel D. Maturing debt by month, Portugal 
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Figure 4. Maturing Debt by Month: Stressed Countries
Notes: Amount of sovereign bonds, in millions of euros, maturing during each month between January 2009 and 
September 2012. Shaded areas represent the high-risk period (starting in January 2010 in the case of Greece, in 
September 2010 in the case of Ireland, in September 2011 in the case of Italy, in April 2010 in the case of Portugal, 
and in July 2011 in the case of Spain). 
Source: Bloomberg
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the econometrician to distinguish between domestic and foreign, as well as between 
different types of domestic banks. We employ the Individual Balance Sheet Statistics 
(IBSI) dataset of the European Central Bank (ECB), the first such dataset to have 
been made available to researchers. This new and unique high-frequency data source 
allows us to use end-of-month data on assets and liabilities, starting in January 2009, 
for 46 domestic and 14 foreign banks active in the five stressed countries. As such, 
it fulfills both criteria, making it possible to bring our novel identification strategy 
to the data.
The key advantage of our month-on-month identification strategy is that it allows 
us to include bank fixed effects and monthly bank balance sheet characteristics, 
thus controlling both for unobservable time-invariant, as well as for observable 
time-varying, bank-specific factors that can impact the decision of a bank to buy 
domestic sovereign bonds during periods of elevated fiscal stress such as risk shift-
ing, carry-trading, regulatory compliance, and differences in investment opportuni-
ties. At the same time, it also makes it possible to include country × month fixed 
effects, which enables us to control for unobservable time-varying country-specific 
factors, such as economic conditions or sovereign creditworthiness.
We run a number of additional tests to put further rigor to the correct interpre-
tation of the results. We show that the differential behavior between domestic and 
foreign banks during high-need months versus low-need months is not accompanied 
by an increase in bank holdings of foreign sovereign bonds or private debt securities, 
and that it is not present in countries under no fiscal stress. We also show that our 
results are not driven by domestic banks acting as primary dealers, by monthly fluc-
tuations in banks’ incentives to shift risk or to comply with regulatory changes, or 
by shocks to their net worth or investment opportunities. Finally, we show that our 
results cannot be explained by moral suasion by foreign regulators, or by the ECB’s 
extraordinary provision of liquidity during the crisis.
Our paper most directly relates to the recent literature on the sovereign-bank 
“doom loop” (Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl 2014; Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi 
2014; and Farhi and Tirole 2018). This literature has proposed several explanations 
for the rise in banks’ domestic sovereign bond holdings, such as creditor discrimina-
tion (Broner et al. 2014), risk shifting (Uhlig 2014, Drechsler et al. 2016), gambling 
for resurrection (Crosignani 2017), carry trading (Acharya and Steffen 2015), or 
government pressure at times when fiscal stress limits investors’ demand (Chari, 
Dovis, and Kehoe 2016). Our paper adds to this literature by tightly identifying the 
latter mechanism.
Furthermore, our paper adds to the empirical literature on the impact of political 
factors on banks’ performance and business decisions. A vast literature building 
on the seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) shows 
that government ownership gives rise to politically motivated lending decisions.5 
In addition, a number of papers have shown that political interests can affect the 
timing of banking deregulation (Kroszner and Strahan 1999), delay foreclosures on 
mortgages (Agarwal et al. 2018), and lead to a delay in the release of news about 
5 See, among others, Sapienza (2004); Dinç (2005); Khwaja and Mian (2005); Micco, Panizza, and Yañez 
(2007); Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008); and Shen and Lin (2012).
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 problems in the banking sector (Brown and Dinç 2005, Imai 2009, Liu and Ngo 
2014) as well as to higher risk taking (Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi 2013). Our paper 
adds to this literature by documenting that government refinancing needs in times 
of fiscal stress affect the composition of domestic banks’ securities portfolios by 
pressuring them to keep purchasing domestic sovereign bonds.
I. Empirical Methodology
The goal of this paper is to study whether during the European sovereign debt cri-
sis governments under fiscal stress pressured or colluded with “their” banks to pur-
chase their own sovereign debt because of limited demand by other investors (moral 
suasion). To this end, we exploit a novel dataset collected by the ECB that captures 
monthly balance sheet data of European banks (we will describe the data in more 
detail in the next section). We use these data to examine banks’ net purchases of 
securities issued by the domestic sovereign over the period January 2009–September 
2012.6 This period includes both the period preceding the sovereign debt crisis 
(“low-risk” period) and the sovereign debt crisis (“high-risk” period). The monthly 
frequency of the data allows us to employ a  difference-in-difference-in-differences 
type of methodology, whereby we compare the behavior of banks that are more 
and less likely to be swayed by the government during months in which the gov-
ernment’s need to sway banks to support it is plausibly high, relative to months of 
low such need. Effectively, we compare in one regression the differential behavior 
of domestic and foreign banks in the pre-crisis (low risk) environment where we do 
not expect moral suasion to play a role, with their behavior during the sovereign debt 
crisis where we do expect moral suasion to play a role during months of high need.
We first identify, for each of the five stressed countries in the dataset, the acute 
phase of the sovereign debt crisis. As is evident from Figure 5, sovereign debt prob-
lems did not arise at the same time in the five countries. While in Greece spreads 
already started to increase in the beginning of 2010, spreads in Italy and Spain only 
started to really take off in mid-2011. To capture as adequately as possible the percep-
tion in the market of significant concerns as regards the sovereign, we use for each 
country as the start of the high-risk period the first month when the country’s average 
credit default swap (CDS) spread on a 10-year sovereign bond breaches the 300-basis 
points (bps) mark and stays there. This means that for Greece, the high-risk period 
starts in January 2010; for Ireland, in September 2010; for Italy, in September 2011; 
for Portugal, in May 2010; and for Spain, in August 2011. We end the sample period 
for all countries in September 2012, the month during which the details of the Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) Program of the ECB were announced.7,8 We show in 
6 January 2009 is the first month for which comprehensive data on maturing debt are available.
7 The OMT Program was first hinted at by ECB President Mario Draghi in a speech at the Global Investment 
Conference in London on July 26, 2012, in which he vowed to do “whatever it takes” to keep the Eurozone together. 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html.
8 We let our sample period end here because even though stress in government bond markets subsided, the 
period after Draghi’s speech is still fundamentally different from the pre-sovereign debt crisis. As a result, compar-
ing only with the period directly preceding the sovereign debt crisis is more appropriate.
354 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MACROECONOMICS OCTOBER 2019
Section IVC that using different definitions of high-risk does not materially alter our 
results.
While spreads were high in each country during the sovereign debt crisis, there 
were large fluctuations within the crisis period with respect to the amount of debt 
each government had to roll over. Such fluctuations are a natural feature of sovereign 
debt management not limited to crises periods. Figure 4 depicts the amount of sov-
ereign debt that matured during each month between January 2009 and September 
2012, as well as during the sovereign debt crisis period (shaded area), for all coun-
tries in the sample. The figure shows large month-on-month fluctuations at all times, 
including during the sovereign debt crisis: for example, the government of Greece 
needed to roll over €2.6 billion in February 2012 and €22.4 billion the next month; 
the government of Portugal had to roll over €2.4 billion in May 2012 and €11.4 
billion the next month; and the government of Spain had to roll over €24.3 billion 
in October 2011 and only €6.2 billion the next month. These sharp monthly fluc-
tuations create an exogenous variation in the need of the government to find inves-
tors for the bonds it needs to place. Hence, the first ingredient in our identification 
strategy exploits the idea that if the government needs banks to alleviate its funding 
pressures by purchasing sovereign bonds, it will be more likely to try to pressure or 
persuade them during months when it needs to roll over a relatively large amount of 
debt. This is what we call “high-need” months.
The second element in our identification strategy exploits the idea (as previ-
ous studies have done) that some banks are more susceptible to pressure by the 
domestic government than others. The most obvious distinguishing characteristic 
of banks that defines their likelihood of being prompted to buy domestic sover-
eign debt is whether they are domestic or foreign. Domestic banks have a stronger 
incentive to collude with the government when demand for domestic sovereign 
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Figure 5. Monthly Average CDS Spread on a 10-Year Sovereign Bond by Country
Note: The figure plots the average monthly CDS spread on a 10-year sovereign bond from January 2009 to 
September 2012 for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Source: Bloomberg
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bonds is weak, as an undersubscribed auction would imply higher sovereign 
spreads, which would directly translate into higher funding costs. Furthermore, 
they are more likely, at some point, to need assistance from the government and 
are more vulnerable to explicit or implicit threats if they refuse to cooperate 
(Romans 1966, Reinhart and Sbrancia 2015). Finally, domestic banks are more 
likely to feel that it is their “moral” or “patriotic” duty to buy sovereign bonds in 
times of fiscal stress.
As such, if banks are morally swayed by their own governments, this should 
imply that during high-need months domestic banks should purchase more domestic 
sovereign debt compared to foreign banks. Conversely, we expect to see little dif-
ference in the behavior of domestic and of foreign banks during low-need months 
when the government does not need to roll over a large amount of maturing debt and 
therefore does not need to pressure any subset of banks. This difference should only 
play up during a period when the sovereign is under severe stress and not during 
other periods.
Clearly, there are other reasons why—even in the absence of moral suasion—
domestic banks would voluntarily choose to purchase more domestically issued 
sovereign bonds than foreign banks during a period of elevated sovereign stress. 
For example, they may be betting on their own survival by acquiring a riskier asset 
portfolio when their sovereign is close to default (Broner et al. 2014, Drechsler et 
al. 2016). In addition, domestic banks—especially undercapitalized ones—may be 
pushed to beef up their regulatory capital by the regulator, who holds no similar 
control over branches of foreign banks. Acquiring more zero-risk sovereign bonds 
can be one obvious way to achieve this. Furthermore, while not necessarily affecting 
domestic banks differently from foreign banks, some banks with access to short-
term unsecured funding in wholesale markets might be more willing to engage in 
a carry-trade-type behavior by establishing longer stressed countries’ sovereign 
bond positions, hoping to pocket the spread between long-term bonds and short-
term funding costs (Acharya and Steffen 2015). They can also be more sensitive to 
changes in local economic conditions or credit demand. Finally, (large) domestic 
banks may act as primary dealers in their own country and as such are more likely 
to buy a larger share of the newly issued debt.
The crucial advantage of our month-on-month identification strategy is that it 
allows us to control for these alternative mechanisms. First, we include bank fixed 
effects that capture any time-invariant differences between banks that affect their 
net purchase of domestic sovereign debt. By including an interaction between high-
need months and the domestic dummy, we control for any dynamics throughout the 
sample period that might lead domestic banks to purchase more domestic sovereign 
bonds in high-need months, compared to foreign banks. By including an interaction 
between high-risk and domestic, we control for a higher propensity of domestic 
banks to purchase domestic sovereign debt during the sovereign debt crisis because 
of, for example, risk shifting. To assuage remaining concerns that our results are 
driven by monthly fluctuations in, for example, risk shifting or carry trading, we run 
in Section IVC additional tests in which we control for monthly changes in banks’ 
incentives to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign debt other than driven 
by moral suasion.
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We model the net purchase of domestic sovereign debt (relative to the stock of 
domestic sovereign debt in the previous month) by bank i from country j in month 
t as follows:
(1)  ∆ Domestic sovereign bonds ijt =  β 1  High risk jt × High need jt ×  Domestic ij 
 +  β 2  High risk jt ×  Domestic ij 
 +  β 3  High need jt ×  Domestic ij 
 +  β 4  X ijt +  β 5  φ i +  β 6  μ jt +  ε ijt , 
where  ∆ Domestic sovereign bonds ijt is the bank’s net flow of securities issued by the 
domestic sovereign at time t, divided by the bank’s total holdings of securities issued 
by the domestic sovereign at time t − 1.  High risk jt is a dummy variable equal to one 
in all the months after the country’s average CDS spread breaches permanently 300 
bps, and to zero before this moment;  High need jt is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the total amount of maturing outstanding domestic sovereign debt in country j in 
month t is above the country median for the sample period, and to zero otherwise; 
Domestic ij    is a dummy variable equal to one if bank i in country j is a domestic 
bank, and to zero if it is foreign owned;    X ijt is a vector of time-varying bank-specific 
control variables;  φ i   is a vector of bank fixed effects;  μ jt   is a matrix of interactions 
of country and month dummies; and  ε ijt is an i.i.d. error term. The independent effect 
of the variables    High risk jt ,  High need jt , and  Domestic ij is not identified because the 
effect of the first two variables is subsumed in the country-month fixed effects, and 
the effect of the third variable is subsumed in the bank fixed effects. The model is 
estimated using OLS, and we cluster standard errors at the bank level to account 
for the fact that banks’ monthly net purchases of domestic sovereign debt are likely 
correlated over time.
Our coefficient of interest is  β 1 . In a classical difference-in-difference-in- 
differences sense, it captures the difference in the net purchase of domestic sover-
eign debt between high-need and low-need months for domestic banks (the treat-
ment group) relative to foreign banks (the control group) during the high-risk period 
relative to the low-risk period. A positive coefficient  β 1 would imply that—all else 
equal and relative to foreign banks—domestic banks purchase more domestic sover-
eign debt in high-need months, compared with low-need months when the sovereign 
is under pressure. The coefficient  β 2 captures the effect of “risk shifting,” i.e., the 
propensity of domestic banks, relative to foreign banks, to increase their holdings of 
domestic sovereign bonds when the risk of the underlying asset increases. Finally, 
the coefficient  β 3 captures the extent to which domestic banks, relative to foreign 
banks, are more likely to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds during 
months when an above-median amount of outstanding domestic sovereign bonds is 
maturing.
The vector of bank-level controls  X ijt allows us to control for a number of 
time-varying bank-specific factors, including changes in bank size, funding sources, 
and capital ratios that can impact a bank’s decision to purchase domestic sovereign 
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debt. In order to account for the fact that the effect of accounting variables may not 
be immediate, we use one-year lags of these variables in the regression. In addition 
to bank fixed effects, we also include the interaction of country and month fixed 
effects. This alleviates concerns that our results might be driven by time-varying 
differences in the demand for sovereign debt or by differences in its quality (at the 
country level) that affects both domestic and foreign banks equally. Identification 
therefore comes from comparing the behavior of domestic and foreign banks in the 
same country during the same month.
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main dataset we employ is the ECB’s Individual Balance Sheet Statistics 
(IBSI) Dataset. This new and unique high-frequency data source contains end-of-
month data on assets and liabilities, starting in August 2007, for 247 individual 
financial institutions in 18 European countries, comprising about 70 percent of the 
domestic banking sector. The dataset is particularly well suited to our novel iden-
tification strategy. First, it captures each individual bank’s net purchase of domes-
tic sovereign bonds as well as the stock it holds at a monthly frequency. Second, 
banks are observed at an unconsolidated level, and therefore the dataset captures 
both domestic banks and affiliates of foreign banks active in a country. Third, the 
long time series allows us to compare the sovereign debt period with the period 
preceding it.
For our analysis, we use 60 banks active in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain for which all relevant information is available.9 We use the bank ownership 
database of Claessens and van Horen (2015) to determine whether a bank is domes-
tic or foreign owned. Those banks that are not covered by the database (mainly 
foreign branches) we check manually. A bank is considered foreign if at least 50 
percent of its shares are owned by foreigners (a definition commonly used in the 
literature). We measure ownership at the start of our sample period. Our sample 
includes 46 domestic and 14 foreign banks, with at least one domestic and one for-
eign bank active in each of our sample countries.10
Our main variable of interest is  ∆ Domestic sovereign bonds , defined as the ratio 
of the bank’s net flow of securities issued by the domestic sovereign at time t to the 
bank’s total holdings of securities issued by the domestic sovereign at time t − 1. 
By using the flow and normalizing by the stock, we proxy for the change in total 
holdings that is due to the purchase of new domestic sovereign debt, and at the same 
time make sure that we do not overweigh banks with large holdings of domestic 
sovereign bonds. We trim the variable at 100 percent in either direction to mitigate 
the impact of potential outliers.
9 The database covers 77 banks active in these countries, however, we were not able to determine the ownership 
status of five of them and another 12 banks did not report information on domestic sovereign bond holdings during 
the sample period (January 2009–September 2012) so we dropped them as well. 
10 Our sample includes 3 domestic and 2 foreign banks in Greece, 4 domestic and 4 foreign banks in Ireland, 18 
domestic and 3 foreign banks in Italy, 3 domestic and 2 foreign banks in Portugal, and 18 domestic and 3 foreign 
banks in Spain. 
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As bank-specific control variables, we include the total assets of the bank (Assets) 
to capture changes in bank size, and three variables that capture (changes in) bank 
health or business model that may impact a bank’s decision to increase its holdings 
of domestic sovereign debt: the ratio of deposits to assets (Deposits/Assets), the 
ratio of loans to deposits (Loans/Deposits), and the ratio of bank equity to total 
assets (Capital/Assets). All bank-level variables are observed with monthly fre-
quency. All control variables are measured with a 12-month lag.
Data on maturing sovereign debt come from the ECB’s Centralized Securities 
Database (CSDB). This database covers all active and matured securities relevant 
to the European System of Central Banks, starting in January 2009. It includes each 
sovereign bond that has been issued and, crucial for our purpose, provides informa-
tion about its maturity date. This enables us to determine for each country in our 
sample how much sovereign debt is maturing in each month over the sample period. 
We define a high-need (low-need) month as a month in which the total amount of 
maturing debt is above (below) the country median for the sample period. Appendix 
Tables A1 and A2 provide definitions and sources for all variables used throughout 
the paper, as well as their summary statistics.
Our identification strategy relies on comparing domestic and foreign banks so it’s 
illustrative to examine how the two bank types compare prior to the sovereign debt 
crisis. The top panel of Table 1 illustrates the difference with respect to a number of 
observable balance sheet characteristics. We find that domestic banks are on average 
larger and have a smaller deposit base, but are not significantly different in terms 
of their loan to deposit ratio and their capitalization.11 While not necessarily obser-
vationally equivalent across all dimensions, domestic and foreign banks are thus 
relatively similar across a number of observable characteristics.
In the bottom panel of Table 1, we examine in what way both types of banks dif-
fer in their propensity to purchase domestic sovereign bonds. Domestic banks held 
on average a higher share of their assets in debt securities issued by the domestic 
government already before the crisis (3.8 percent versus 2.6 percent). However, this 
difference is not statistically significant indicating that foreign affiliates had compa-
rable holdings of domestic sovereign bonds.12 We also find that prior to the crisis, 
there is no statistical difference in the propensity to increase holdings of domestic 
sovereign bonds between domestic and foreign banks in both low- and high-need 
months. Finally, we also document a similar pattern between domestic and foreign 
banks when we compare the bank-specific variation over time in the propensity to 
11 For each variable in Table 1, we first calculate the average per bank over the period before the sovereign debt 
crisis. We then take the average for the group of domestic and the group of foreign banks. 
12 As further evidence that foreign affiliates hold significant amount of domestic sovereign debt, we also com-
pare the stock of domestic sovereign debt at the foreign affiliate level with the stock of that same debt at the holding 
level using information from the first EBA stress test (March 2010). That is, we compare the holdings of Spanish 
debt (as recorded in IBSI) of bank X, which is a subsidiary of bank Y in Spain, with the total holdings of Spanish 
debt by bank Y reported in the EBA stress test. We find that, on average, the foreign affiliates of the banks included 
in the EBA stress test hold 43.3 percent of the host-country debt that the group as a whole reported to the EBA. 
For each individual country, the respective numbers are 7.4 percent in Greece, 7.3 percent in Ireland, 50.1 percent 
in Italy, 41.6 percent in Spain, and 62.7 percent in Portugal. Unfortunately, we are not at liberty to disclose this 
information at the individual bank level.
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acquire domestic sovereign bonds. This again holds for both low- and high-need 
months.
The statistical regularities assuage the potential concern with our identification 
strategy that foreign banks are not a proper control group because few foreign sub-
sidiaries hold sovereign debt issued by the country where they operate, or because 
they do not respond to new buying opportunities of sovereign bonds in the local 
market. They also suggest that there is sufficient variation both between and within 
banks over time.
III. Empirical Evidence
A. Moral Suasion: Main Result
The headline results of the paper are reported in Table 2. We estimate three dif-
ferent permutations of equation (1). In column 1, we only include on the right-hand 
side  High need × Domestic and  High risk × Domestic , as well as bank fixed effects 
and interactions of country and month dummies. The results show that the net pur-
chase of domestic sovereign debt securities during the crisis period is significantly 
higher for domestic banks compared to foreign banks. The effect is economically 
meaningful, too: compared to foreign banks, domestic banks’ monthly net increase 
in domestic sovereign bond holdings is on average 7.9 percentage points higher. 
Given that any time-invariant home bias by domestic banks is captured by the bank 
Table 1—Domestic versus Foreign Banks, Pre-sovereign Debt Crisis
Variable Foreign Domestic Difference
Bank-level controls
log (Assets) 10.335 11.033 −0.698
Deposits/Assets 0.606 0.496 0.110
Loans/Deposits 1.156 1.611 −0.456
Capital/Assets 0.108 0.100 0.008
Propensity to purchase domestic sovereign bonds
Domestic sovereign bonds/Assets 0.026 0.038 −0.012
ΔDomestic sovereign bonds 0.018 0.024 −0.006
ΔDomestic sovereign bonds, low-need months 0.022 0.032 −0.010
ΔDomestic sovereign bonds, high-need months 0.014 0.015 −0.001
std(ΔDomestic sovereign bonds) 0.137 0.133 0.004
std(ΔDomestic sovereign bonds), low-need months 0.128 0.131 −0.003
std(ΔDomestic sovereign bonds), high-need months 0.136 0.125 0.011
Notes: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates from a Mann-Whitney two-sided t-test for domestic 
versus foreign banks. The sample includes 46 domestic and 14 foreign banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain. Mean values are calculated over a sample period that starts in January 2009 for all countries and ends 
in December 2009 for Greece, April 2010 for Portugal, August 2010 for Ireland, July 2011 for Spain, and August 
2011 for Italy. All variables are observed with monthly frequency. “log(Assets)” denotes the natural logarithm of the 
bank’s total assets. “Deposits/Assets” denotes the ratio of the bank’s total deposits to total assets. “Loans/Deposits” 
denotes the ratio of the bank’s total loans issued to total assets. “ Capital/Assets” denotes the ratio of the bank’s 
equity to total assets. “Domestic sovereign bonds/Assets” denotes the ratio of the bank’s stock of sovereign bonds 
issued by the domestic government to the bank’s total assets. “ΔDomestic sovereign bonds” denotes the ratio of the 
bank’s net flow of sovereign bonds issued by the domestic government at time t to the bank’s total holdings of sov-
ereign bonds issued by the domestic government at time t − 1, for the pre-crisis period. “ std(ΔDomestic sovereign 
bonds)” is the standard deviation of “ΔDomestic sovereign bonds” for each bank over the respective sample period.
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fixed effects, the coefficient on the variable  High risk × Domestic captures an asset 
substitution effect whereby domestic banks have a higher average propensity than 
foreign banks to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds when the risk 
of the underlying asset is higher (i.e., risk shifting). At the same time, we find that 
on average, domestic banks are not more likely to load on domestic sovereign bonds 
during months of elevated government refinancing need.
In column 2, we add the triple interaction  High risk × High need × Domestic. 
The point estimate strongly suggests that during the high-risk period, and relative 
to foreign banks, domestic banks are significantly more likely to increase their 
holdings of domestic sovereign bonds during high-need months, compared to low-
need months. Importantly, in periods when the sovereign is not under fiscal stress, 
 domestic banks do not have a higher propensity to buy domestic sovereign debt 
during high-need months. The main effect still obtains when we include one-year 
Table 2—Moral Suasion: Main Results
ΔDomestic sovereign bonds
(1) (2) (3)
High risk  × High need  × Domestic 0.070 0.071
(0.031) (0.031)
High risk  × Domestic 0.079 0.044 0.049
(0.020) (0.027) (0.026)
High need  × Domestic 0.008 −0.024 −0.027
(0.013) (0.021) (0.021)
log(Assets) −0.006
(0.025)
Deposits/Assets −0.122
(0.083)
Loans/Deposits −0.002
(0.007)
Capital/Assets 0.109
(0.150)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country  × Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18
Number of banks 60 60 60
Observations 2,484 2,484 2,484
Notes: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the propensity of banks to 
purchase sovereign bonds issued by the domestic government. The sample includes 46 domes-
tic and 14 foreign banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The sample period is 
January 2009–September 2012. The dependent variable is the ratio of the bank’s net flow of 
sovereign bonds issued by the domestic government at time t to the bank’s total holdings of 
sovereign bonds issued by the domestic sovereign at time t − 1. “High risk” is a dummy vari-
able equal to 1 in all the months after the country’s average CDS spread breaches permanently 
300 basis points (i.e., January 2010 for Greece, May 2010 for Portugal, September 2010 for 
Ireland, August 2011 for Spain, and September 2011 for Italy). “High need” is a dummy vari-
able equal to 1 if the amount of maturing domestic sovereign bonds in a particular month is 
above the country-specific median for the sample period. “Domestic” is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the bank is domestically owned. “log(Assets)” denotes the natural logarithm of 
the bank’s total assets in million euro. “Deposits/Assets” denotes the ratio of the bank’s total 
deposits to total assets. “Loans/Deposits” denotes the ratio of the bank’s total loans issued to 
total assets. “Capital/Assets” denotes the ratio of the bank’s equity to total assets. All bank 
controls are one-year lagged. All regressions include fixed effects as specified. Standard errors 
clustered at the bank level appear in parentheses.
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lagged bank-specific balance sheet characteristics, in addition to the bank fixed 
effects, and the interactions of country and month dummies (column 3). In this 
specification, we find that banks are on average less likely to increase their holdings 
of domestic sovereign bonds if they have a higher ratio of deposits to total assets.
Both in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2, the “moral suasion” effect is significant at 
the 5 percent statistical level and economically large. In the most saturated specifi-
cation in column 3, the point estimate on  β 1 implies that during high-need months, 
and compared with foreign banks, domestic banks increase their holdings of 
 domestically-issued sovereign debt by 7.1 percentage points more. This corresponds 
to 0.46 sample standard deviations. Because we control for bank fixed effects, for 
country × month fixed effects, and for time-varying bank-specific characteristics, 
it is unlikely that our results are driven by unobservable time-invariant bank hetero-
geneity, by country-specific changes in the demand for domestic sovereign debt, or 
by the propensity of banks to adjust their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds in 
response to capital or liquidity shocks.13
Our results thus strongly suggest that during periods of elevated sovereign stress, 
when it is potentially difficult for the government to find interested investors, domes-
tic banks are considerably more likely to support their government during months 
when it needs to roll over a relatively large amount of outstanding debt. Importantly, 
this moral suasion effect coexists with the risk-shifting effect, and the latter is still 
significant at the 5 percent statistical level in column 3. However, the risk-shifting 
effect itself declines by around 40 percent when we control for the moral suasion 
channel, suggesting that empirical tests which do not properly identify the moral 
suasion channel will overestimate the extent of risk shifting by banks.
B. Falsification Tests
The mechanism that we aim to uncover has two key components: one, it should 
only take place during times of fiscal stress when the government has trouble 
(re-)financing its debt; and two, it should only relate to purchases of bonds issued 
by the domestic sovereign. This allows us to perform a number of falsification tests 
to ensure we are indeed picking up moral suasion.
In Table 3, we first test for differences in the propensity of domestic versus foreign 
banks to purchase asset classes other than domestic sovereign bonds in high need 
months. We find that during the high-risk period, there is no statistical difference in 
the behavior of domestic and foreign banks in high- versus low-need months with 
respect to their purchases of foreign sovereign bonds (column 1) nor with respect 
to private securities (column 2).14 This indicates that variation in  governments’ 
13 We also estimated the model allowing for the bank fixed effects to differ for the low- and high-risk period. 
This does not materially affect our results (results available upon request). 
14 Holdings of foreign sovereign bonds relative to assets are on average lower than holdings of domestic bonds, 
with domestic banks holding 0.4 percent and foreign banks 2.1 percent. Before the crisis, domestic banks held, on 
average, 6.3 percent of their assets in private securities and foreign banks 8.6 percent. For both asset classes and for 
both types of banks, there is significant variation both across banks and within banks over time. Importantly, the 
difference in variation in within-bank net purchases between the two groups of banks is insignificant.
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 refinancing needs only affects the extent to which banks purchase domestic sover-
eign bonds (as documented in Table 2).15
As a second falsification test, we estimate the model for 38 domestic and 7 for-
eign banks active in Germany during the period January 2009–September 2012. We 
define  High risk as the period after May 2010 (i.e., the month of the first Greek bail-
out).16 During this period, there was ample demand for German bonds. Therefore, 
even if domestic banks were increasing their holdings of sovereign debt for other 
reasons, there was no need for the German government to put additional pressure 
on their banks. Indeed, our results show that in those months when relatively large 
volumes of German government debt matured, domestic banks did not buy more 
German sovereign debt relative to foreign banks (column 3).
15 The evidence further suggests that our results are not contaminated by carry trade-type behavior whereby 
banks use cheap wholesale funds to buy high-yield government debt. If this was the case, there would be no reason 
for banks in all five countries to increase their holdings of domestic debt, but they would rather go for the riskiest 
sovereign debt at the time (e.g., Greek government debt).
16 To make the sample of German banks as comparable as possible to the sample of GIIPS banks, we only 
include 45 of the available 56 German banks in our dataset. In particular, we drop 9  Landesbanken—govern-
ment-owned head institutions of all Sparkassen operating in the same state, which are very large compared to the 
rest—as well as two small regional banks, which are, in terms of assets, smaller than the smallest bank in the GIIPS 
sample.
Table 3—Moral Suasion: Falsification Tests
Δ Foreign 
sovereign bonds
Δ Private 
securities
Δ Domestic sovereign 
bonds, Germany
(1) (2) (3)
High risk  × High need  × Domestic 0.004 −0.020 0.003
(0.030) (0.033) (0.032)
High risk  × Domestic 0.012 −0.014 −0.021
(0.030) (0.013) (0.011)
High need  × Domestic −0.001 0.017 −0.004
(0.021) (0.020) (0.033)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country  × Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.22 0.20 0.08
Number of banks 47 60 45
Observations 1,662 2,462 1,894
Notes: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the propensity of banks to purchase government 
debt securities or to issue loans to sovereigns. The sample includes 38 domestic and 9 foreign banks (column 1); 
46 domestic and 14 foreign banks (column 2) in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; and 38 domestic and 7 
foreign banks in Germany (column 3). The sample period is January 2009–September 2012. The dependent vari-
able is the ratio of the bank’s net flow of sovereign bonds issued by foreign governments at time t to the bank’s total 
holdings of sovereign bonds issued by foreign governments at time t − 1 (column 1), the ratio of the bank’s net flow 
of securities issued by the private sector at time t to the bank’s total stock of securities issued by the private sector 
at time t − 1 (column 2), and the bank’s net flow of sovereign bonds issued by the domestic government at time t 
to the bank’s total holdings of sovereign bonds issued by the domestic government at time t − 1 (column 3). “High 
risk” is a dummy variable equal to 1 in all the months after the country’s average CDS spread breaches permanently 
300 basis points (i.e., January 2010 for Greece, May 2010 for Portugal, September 2010 for Ireland, August 2011 
for Spain, and September 2011 for Italy), or after May 2010 for Germany. “High need” is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the amount of maturing domestic sovereign bonds in a particular month is above the country-specific median 
for the sample period. “Domestic” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is domestically owned. All regressions 
include the rest of the bank-specific variables from Table 2, as well as fixed effects as specified. Standard errors 
clustered at the bank level appear in parentheses.
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We conclude that the phenomenon we document—domestic banks being signifi-
cantly more likely than foreign banks to increase their holdings of domestic sover-
eign bonds during months in which the government has relatively larger refinancing 
needs—only occurs in fiscally stressed countries, and only affects domestically 
issued sovereign bonds. Therefore, this finding is fully consistent with the occur-
rence of moral suasion in sovereign debt markets.
C. Robustness
Robust High Risk, High Need, and Sample.—The empirical approach we employ 
throughout the paper rests on distinguishing the behavior of domestic and foreign 
banks between months with high and months with low refinancing need, under the 
assumption that any portfolio adjustment will be driven by lack of sufficient investor 
demand during periods of elevated sovereign stress. This approach makes it neces-
sary to make a clear distinction between periods of high risk and periods of low risk 
for each country. Our measure of high risk so far is based on a market definition, 
whereby we have chosen as the start of the high-risk period in each country the 
month during which the CDS spread on a 10-year government bond permanently 
breached the 300-bps threshold. To make sure that our results are not driven by this 
particular choice, we now test whether our results still obtain when we employ alter-
native definitions of elevated sovereign risk.
First, our measure of high-risk is an absolute measure and assumes that the 
moment when the perception of the market changes is the same for all five coun-
tries. This idea is reasonable given that margin calls are often related to specific hard 
thresholds. Furthermore, the CDS spreads of the five countries and their volatility 
were in the run up to the sovereign debt crisis reasonably similar. However, it is 
equally justifiable to argue that the concept of high-risk should be relative and that 
one should measure relative changes in the CDS spread within the same country. 
To capture the concept that the demarcation between low- and high-risk periods 
varies per country, we use the log of the CDS spread instead of a dummy variable to 
allow for sovereign risk to change continuously. The estimates reported in Table 4, 
column 1, show that the moral suasion channel is present regardless of whether we 
take an absolute or relative measure.
We next employ four alternative definitions of high risk. First, to make sure that 
our definition of elevated sovereign risk is not driven by one particular market, we 
assign the start of the high-risk period to the month during which the CDS spread on 
a 10-year sovereign bond breaches the 300-bps threshold for the first time, regardless 
of whether it stays above this level or not (column 2). This moves the beginning of 
the high-risk period all the way to December 2010 in the case of Spain (see Figure 4). 
Second, we assign the start of the high-risk period to the month in which the yield on 
a 10-year government bond permanently breached 500 bps for each individual coun-
try. Relative to our main definition, the high-risk period now starts one month later 
in Greece and one month earlier in Italy and in Spain (column 3). Third, we date 
the high-risk period based on the activation of the ECB’s Security Markets Program 
(SMP) for each individual country (column 4). Under this  program, the ECB started 
purchasing sovereign bonds in secondary markets. The program was activated in 
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May 2010 for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, and in July 2011 for Italy and Spain. 
Finally, we assign the same high-risk period to each country, starting in September 
2010, the month when the median country in our sample, Ireland, entered a period of 
elevated sovereign stress according to our main definition (column 5). The evidence 
from these tests strongly suggests that neither the statistical significance nor the eco-
nomic magnitude of the “moral suasion” mechanism we documented so far is overly 
sensitive to how we define country-specific elevated sovereign stress. While in some 
cases the effect is only significant at the 10-percent statistical level, the evidence is 
uniformly consistent with the idea that domestic banks are more likely to support 
the domestic government during periods of sovereign stress, in months when the 
government is facing high refinancing needs.
Table 4 —Moral Suasion: Robust High Risk and High Government Need
ΔDomestic sovereign bonds
log 
(Average
monthly 
CDS)
First time 
CDS 
≥300bp 
Bond 
yield 
≥500bp
SMP 
dates
High risk 
after 
September 
2010
Long-term 
maturing
debt
75% 
cutoff 
Share 
maturing 
debt
Auctioned 
debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
High risk  × High need 0.028 0.086 0.070 0.058 0.067 0.062 0.048 0.810 0.051
  × Domestic (0.015) (0.040) (0.041) (0.035) (0.045) (0.031) (0.028) (0.308) (0.031)
High risk ×  Domestic 0.021 0.031 0.034 0.051 0.020 0.061 0.070 0.015 0.074
(0.013) (0.031) (0.031) (0.026) (0.034) (0.023) (0.025) (0.038) (0.029)
High need  × Domestic −0.033 −0.037 −0.031 −0.024 −0.031 −0.031 −0.006 −0.707 0.021
(0.033) (0.026) (0.027) (0.022) (0.031) (0.033) (0.022) (0.300) (0.026)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country  × Month  
 fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18
Number of banks 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484
Notes: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the propensity of banks to purchase sovereign 
bonds issued by the domestic government. The sample includes 46 domestic and 14 foreign banks in Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The sample period is January 2009–September 2012. The dependent variable 
is the ratio of the bank’s net flow of securities issued by the domestic sovereign at time t to the bank’s total hold-
ings of securities issued by the domestic sovereign at time t − 1. “High risk” is the (log of the) average monthly 
CDS spread in column 1; a dummy variable equal to 1 in each month after the monthly CDS spread on a 10-year 
sovereign bond breaches 300 basis points for the first time (i.e., January 2010 for Greece, May 2010 for Portugal, 
September 2010 for Ireland, December 2010 for Spain, and August 2011 for Italy) in column 2; a dummy vari-
able equal to 1 in all the months after the average monthly yield on a 10-year sovereign bond breaches perma-
nently 500 basis points (i.e., February 2010 for Greece, May 2010 for Portugal, September 2010 for Ireland, July 
2011 for Spain, and August 2011 for Italy) in column 3; a dummy variable equal to 1 after the activation of the 
ECB’s Securities Markets Program (i.e., May 2010 for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, and July 2011 for Italy and 
Spain) in column 4; a dummy equal to 1 after September 2010 in column 5; and a dummy variable equal to 1 in 
all the months after the country’s average CDS spread breaches permanently 300 basis points (i.e., January 2010 
for Greece, May 2010 for Portugal, September 2010 for Ireland, August 2011 for Spain, and September 2011 for 
Italy) in columns 6–10. “High need” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the amount of maturing domestic sovereign 
bonds in a particular month is above the country-specific median for the sample period columns 1–5; a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the amount of maturing sovereign bonds issued by the domestic government with maturity of 
more than 5 years in a particular month is above the country-specific median for the sample period in column 6; a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the total amount of maturing sovereign debt in a particular month is above the coun-
try-specific seventy-fifth percentile for the sample period in column 7; the share of maturing debt out of all debt 
maturing during the current calendar year in column 8; and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the total amount of auc-
tioned sovereign debt in a particular month is above the country-specific median for the sample period in column 9. 
“Domestic” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is domestically owned. All regressions include the rest of 
the bank-specific variables from Table 2, as well as fixed effects as specified. Standard errors clustered at the bank 
level appear in parentheses.
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We next demonstrate that our results remain robust to alternative choices with 
respect to our definition of high-need months. Addressing the concern that some 
governments had to shorten the maturity of the debt auctioned, we show that our 
results hold when our  High  need variable is based on only maturing long-term 
bonds, i.e., bonds with a maturity higher than 5 years (column 6). We also find evi-
dence of moral suasion when we define high-need months as those months when the 
government’s refinancing need is in the top country-specific quartile for the sample 
period, and equal to zero otherwise (column 7). Similarly, our results remain when 
we replace the  High need dummy with a continuous treatment variable defined as 
the fraction of outstanding debt being rolled over in each month (column 8). Finally, 
while less exogenous than maturing debt, a government’s true need to sway banks 
during a particular month might be more adequately captured by the volume of 
new debt that is being auctioned. However, due to idiosyncratic shocks (such as 
a decline in tax revenue), auctioned debt and maturing debt are not perfectly cor-
related (although its correlation is very high at 0.78). When we reclassify months of 
high versus low government refinancing need based on the amount of government 
bonds that are auctioned in each month (column 9), the main result of the paper still 
obtains (significant at the 10 percent statistical level).
Finally, we show in Table 5 that our results are robust to analyzing different sam-
ples. Our results remain largely unaffected when dropping Greece (the country most 
affected by the crisis, column 1) or Ireland (which did not auction any sovereign 
bonds between October 2010 and June 2012, column 2). Our results also survive 
when we drop those country-months when no sovereign debt was auctioned (col-
umn 3). To address the concern that the observed patterns are driven by the ECB’s 
two long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) in December 2011 and March 2012, 
we exclude these two months from the sample period. On these dates, the ECB dis-
tributed around €1 trillion to euro area banks in loans of longer than usual maturities 
at fixed rates. The evidence strongly suggests that the moral suasion effect is not 
driven by the LTRO, with domestic banks more likely than foreign banks to pur-
chase domestic debt even outside of the months of the two ECB’s LTROs (column 
4). Finally, we show that the results hold when we estimate our model using a sam-
ple that is chosen based on a propensity score matching procedure.17 We find that 
even within the matched sample, domestic banks increase their holdings of domestic 
sovereign bonds relatively more during high-need months (column 5).
Alternative Channels.—Our identification strategy is based on exploiting the 
fact that during the height of the sovereign debt crisis, there were months during 
which—because of decisions made by previous governments—governments had to 
roll over a relatively large amount of debt, and months during which the amount of 
public debt that needed to be rolled over was relatively low. This strategy allows 
us to control for both unobservable time-invariant and observable time-varying 
bank characteristics that can impact the decision of banks to buy sovereign bonds 
17 We calculate a propensity score for each bank’s likelihood of being domestic versus foreign, based on 
 pre-crises values of the bank-specific controls that exhibit statistically significant differences across the two groups. 
We next reduce the sample of domestic banks to the subset that is most similar to the sample of foreign banks.
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during the sovereign debt crisis, while at the same time controlling for unobservable 
time-varying country-specific factors that can impact all banks active in a particular 
country. However, there can still be lingering concerns related to the possibility 
that other incentives drive domestic banks to behave differently from foreign banks 
during high-need months. We address these in Table 6.
The fact that the high-need months are distributed rather randomly over the course 
of the sample period (Figure 4), suggests that our results are highly unlikely to be 
driven by a mechanism whereby domestic banks are buying more bonds for regu-
latory purposes, or are facing shocks to their balance sheet that hit their net worth 
during the same months when the government’s refinancing needs are particularly 
high. To make sure that this mechanism is indeed not driving our results, we allow 
the impact of our bank-specific control variables to vary across domestic and foreign 
banks, both on average and especially during the high-risk period. As can be seen in 
column 1, the point estimate on the interaction  High risk × High need × Domestic 
hardly changes, confirming the intuition that “moral suasion” is a mechanism inde-
pendent of the impact of concurrent shocks to banks’ balance sheets.
Table 5—Moral Suasion: Robust Sample
ΔDomestic sovereign bonds
Excluding
Greece
Excluding
Ireland
Excluding
no-auction 
months
Excluding
LTRO months
Matched 
sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High risk  × High need  × Domestic 0.060 0.062 0.070 0.094 0.071
(0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.040) (0.031)
High risk  × Domestic 0.062 0.077 0.061 0.032 0.062
(0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026)
High need × Domestic −0.021 −0.028 −0.025 −0.030 −0.031
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country  × Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.21
Number of banks 55 52 60 60 47
Observations 2,260 2,155 2,338 2,373 1,831
Notes: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the propensity of banks to purchase sovereign 
bonds issued by the domestic government. The sample includes 46 domestic and 14 foreign banks in Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, unless otherwise specified. The sample period is January 2009–September 2012. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of the bank’s net flow of securities issued by the domestic sovereign at time t 
to the bank’s total holdings of securities issued by the domestic sovereign at time t − 1. “High risk” is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 in all the months after the country’s average CDS spread breaches permanently 300 basis points 
(i.e., January 2010 for Greece, May 2010 for Portugal, September 2010 for Ireland, August 2011 for Spain, and 
September 2011 for Italy). “High need” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the amount of maturing domestic sov-
ereign bonds in a particular month is above the country-specific median for the sample period. “Domestic” is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is domestically owned. In column 1, all banks from Greece are excluded. In 
column 2, all banks from Ireland are excluded. In column 3, all country-months with no sovereign bond auctions are 
excluded. In column 4, the month of the ECB’s first three-year LTRO (December 2011) and the month of the ECB’s 
second three-year LTRO (March 2012) are excluded. In column 5, the sample is chosen based on a Propensity Score 
Matching procedure using pre-crisis values of “log(Assets)” and “Deposits/Assets.” All regressions include the rest 
of the bank-specific variables from Table 2, as well as fixed effects as specified. Standard errors clustered at the 
bank level appear in parentheses.
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Another possible confounding mechanism is that a bank’s incentive to shift risk 
might vary over time. While our baseline model allows for domestic banks to have 
on average a higher propensity to engage in risk shifting, our results can be biased 
if risk-shifting incentives are higher in high-need months. This could be the case if 
bank’s CDS spreads happen to be elevated during those months. To make sure our 
results are not driven by this, we add an interaction of  Domestic with each bank’s 
CDS spread in each particular month (column 2).18 The estimates indicate that our 
baseline result is hardly affected.19
If governments are perceived by investors to be riskier during months with high 
refinancing needs, this could be another reason that domestic banks might be more 
prone to risk shifting in these months. In column 3, we formally test whether this 
is affecting our results by adding an interaction between the spread on a 10-year 
18 As we do not have information on all banks’ CDSs, the number of observations is reduced to 1,753.
19 Note that the bank fixed effects already pick up the fact that some banks were perceived as riskier than others 
by the market. Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that a shift in the bank’s CDS spread does not have a statisti-
cally significant independent effect.
Table 6—Moral Suasion: Alternative Channels
ΔDomestic sovereign bonds
Balance 
sheet 
shocks
Bank
risk
Sovereign
risk
Business
sentiment
Primary
dealers
Foreign 
banks’ 
suasion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High risk  × High need  × Domestic 0.070 0.062 0.070 0.065 0.073
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032)
High risk  ×  Domestic 0.128 0.067 0.424 0.063 0.041
(0.117) (0.032) (0.142) (0.024) (0.025)
High need  × Domestic −0.031 −0.034 −0.031 −0.027 −0.029
(0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
High risk  × log(Assets)  ×  Domestic −0.015
(0.008)
High risk  ×  Deposits/Assets × Domestic 0.069
(0.055)
High risk  × Loans/Deposits  × Domestic 0.022
(0.005)
High risk  × Capital/Assets  × Domestic 0.381
(0.236)
log(Assets)  × Domestic 0.036
(0.077)
Deposits/Assets  × Domestic −0.043
(0.165)
Loans/Deposits  × Domestic 0.007
(0.014)
Capital/Assets × Domestic −0.584
(0.261)
Bank CDS  ×  Domestic −0.001
(0.001)
Bank CDS 0.001
(0.001)
(continued)
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domestic sovereign bond and  High  risk × Domestic .20 Our main results remain 
virtually the same. This is not surprising given that the unconditional correlation 
between the  High need dummy and the spread on 10-year government bond yields 
20 In unreported regressions, we control for the domestic sovereign CDS spread instead of bond yields. The 
main result is unchanged (available upon request).
ΔDomestic sovereign bonds
Balance 
sheet 
shocks
Bank
risk
Sovereign
risk
Business
sentiment
Primary
dealers
Foreign 
banks’ 
suasion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High risk  × 10-year bond yield spread  × Domestic −0.077
(0.029)
10-year bond yield spread  × Domestic 0.075
(0.029)
High risk  × Δ Business sentiment index  × Domestic 0.289
(0.083)
Δ Business sentiment index  × Domestic −0.198
(0.053)
High risk  × High need  × Primary dealer 0.018
(0.027)
High need  × Primary dealer −0.010
(0.021)
High risk × Primary dealer −0.055
(0.021)
High risk  × High need −0.017
(0.026)
High risk −0.073
(0.022)
High need −0.008
(0.017)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country  × Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.09
Number of banks 60 60 60 60 60 14
Observations 2,484 1,753 2,484 2,155 2,484 567
Notes: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the propensity of banks to purchase sovereign 
bonds issued by the domestic government. The sample includes 46 domestic and 14 foreign banks (columns 1–5) 
and 14 foreign banks (column 6) in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The sample period is January 2009–
September 2012. The dependent variable is the ratio of the bank’s net flow of securities issued by the domestic 
sovereign at time t to the bank’s total holdings of securities issued by the domestic sovereign at time t − 1. “High 
risk” is a dummy variable equal to 1 in all the months after the country’s average CDS spread breaches perma-
nently 300 basis points (i.e., January 2010 for Greece, May 2010 for Portugal, September 2010 for Ireland, August 
2011 for Spain, and September 2011 for Italy). “High need” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the amount of matur-
ing domestic sovereign bonds in a particular month is above the country-specific median for the sample period. 
“Domestic” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is domestically owned. “log(Assets)” denotes the natural 
logarithm of the bank’s total assets in million euro. “Deposits/Assets” denotes the ratio of the bank’s total deposits 
to total assets. “Loans/Deposits” denotes the ratio of the bank’s total loans issued to total assets. “ Capital/Assets” 
denotes the ratio of the bank’s equity to total assets. “Bank CDS” is the bank’s own CDS spread. All bank controls 
are one-year lagged. “10-year bond yield spread” is the spread on a 10-year domestic sovereign bond. “Δ Business 
sentiment index” denotes the month-on-month change in the country’s indicator of business sentiment reported by 
the European Commission. “Primary dealer” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is certified by the gov-
ernment to participate in government bond auctions. All regressions include the rest of the bank-specific variables 
from Table 2, as well as fixed effects as specified. Standard errors clustered at the bank level appear in parentheses.
Table 6—Moral Suasion: Alternative Channels (continued)
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in our sample is −0.4, suggesting that government default risk is actually lower 
during high-need months.
Another concern is that domestic banks can face lower returns on private invest-
ment during high-need months, for example, because of poorer investment oppor-
tunities during high-need months, which disproportionately affect domestic banks 
that likely have stronger ties to the local economy. If so, then domestic banks may 
have an incentive to move their funds toward domestic sovereign bonds during such 
months, for reasons unrelated to moral suasion. In column 4, we test formally for 
this possibility by adding an interaction of  High risk × Domestic with the change 
in the country-specific Business Sentiment Index published each month by the 
European Commission. Importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term captur-
ing the “moral suasion” channel is still positive and significant.
It is also possible that domestic banks are serving as primary dealers and, as 
such, purchase elevated amounts of domestic sovereign debt not because they are 
pressured by the government, but because they are acting on behalf of non-eligible 
banks’ behest. This is unlikely to drive our results as most primary dealers are for-
eign rather than domestic banks.21 Nevertheless, in column 5, we formally control 
for the possibility that primary dealers might bias our results. This turns out not to 
be the case.
Finally, we examine whether our results are driven by foreign banks reducing 
their exposures during high-need months. This could be the case if foreign banks 
are explicitly asked by their regulators to decrease their holdings of risky foreign 
sovereign debt especially during high-need months, or because foreign banks price 
the credit risk embedded in government bonds of stressed countries differently than 
their domestic peers, especially in months of high refinancing needs. Restricting 
our sample to foreign banks only, we show that, on average, foreign banks are less 
likely to purchase domestic sovereign bond during the high-risk period (column 6). 
Crucially, this behavior does not vary across high-need and low-need months, sug-
gesting that the “moral suasion” channel we document is not driven by foreign 
banks’ pricing sovereign risk differently than domestic banks in high-need months.
IV. Moral Suasion: Mechanisms
We now turn to analyzing the mechanisms driving moral suasion. Ex ante, there 
are two such mechanisms. First, moral suasion might be a natural reaction to the 
governance relationship between banks and the government. If banks are connected 
to the government or are governed by government officials, they are under the gov-
ernment’s direct influence and as a result may react to its needs (e.g., Acharya and 
Steffen 2015, Becker and Ivashina 2018). Second, moral suasion might be the nat-
ural reaction of relatively weak banks who either have a strong incentive to keep 
sovereign spreads from rising too much in order to keep their own funding cost in 
21 We gathered information from websites of the Ministry of Finance in each country and through the European 
Primary Dealers Handbook in order to determine the certified primary dealers in each country and in each year. 
Fourteen global banks are certified as primary dealers in at least four of the GIIPS countries. 
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check or who anticipate the need for government assistance in the near future (but 
cannot be sure to receive it).
To examine the relative importance of both mechanisms, we test in Table 7 for 
moral suasion within the sample of domestic banks and create subgroups of banks 
that are more likely to be swayed, based on the above natural priors. If the “political 
connections” mechanism is driving moral suasion, its effect will be concentrated in 
banks that are connected to the government, either through direct ownership or via 
board relationships. If the “bank health” mechanism is driving moral suasion, banks 
of worse quality—e.g., poorly capitalized banks or banks with a less stable funding 
structure—would be the ones driving the result.22
To examine the importance of the first mechanism, we construct a number of vari-
ables capturing different levels of government control. First, we determine whether 
a domestic bank is state owned or not, the most direct measure of government influ-
ence. We follow De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016) and Altavilla, Pagano, and 
Simonelli (2017) by denoting a bank as state owned if at least some bank equity 
is held by the national or local government or by publicly controlled institutions 
(such as Fondazioni in Italy and Fundaciones and Cajas in Spain).23 Using this 
approach, we identify 23 banks as state owned. We also create a continuous measure 
of this variable, which captures the fraction of the bank’s shares held by the local 
or national government or by publicly controlled institutions.24 Government owner-
ship is measured at the start of the sovereign debt crisis.
Next, we determine the extent of government support extended to domestic banks 
during the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 or in its direct aftermath. This infor-
mation is hand-collected using several sources including the EU Commission State 
Aid Database. We classify a bank as “supported” if it received any kind of gov-
ernment assistance (e.g., recapitalization, liquidity injection guarantee, etc.) and 
regardless of the size of the support. All in all, 16 domestic banks in our sample 
received such support, and there is at least one such bank in each country in our 
dataset.
Finally, we classify banks based on the political connections of their board. This 
allows us to capture the fact that board members with past or current affiliation with 
the government might have a strong influence on the management of a bank even 
when the bank is not state-owned (see De Marco and Macchiavelli 2016). We use 
two definitions: the share of the executive board that is or has been politically affil-
iated with the central government, and the share of the supervisory board that is or 
has been politically affiliated with the central government. This share ranges from 
zero in both cases to 86 percent in the case of the executive board and to 41 percent 
in the case of the supervisory board (see Appendix Table A2).25
22 Focusing only on the group of domestic banks also helps alleviate any residual concerns that foreign banks 
are not an appropriate control group.
23 Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi (2013) uses a stricter definition and only classify a bank as state owned when 
bank equity is held by the national or local government.
24 This information is manually collected from banks’ annual reports.
25 We thank Victoria Ivashina for kindly sharing with us her dataset, which (unfortunately for us) only captures 
banks included in the EBA stress tests.
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To test the impact of the “bank health” mechanism, we construct a number of 
balance sheet variables. As balance sheet data in IBSI are limited, we download 
additional (annual) balance sheet data from Bankscope for the domestic banks in 
the dataset. We focus on variables that are accepted empirical proxies for bank 
health and net worth: total assets, Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, the ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets, the ratio of loans to deposits, and the ratio of nonperforming 
loans (NPLs) to total assets.26 In addition, we also use information from IBSI on 
each bank’s holdings of domestic sovereign bonds to total assets. For each variable 
we use its value as of end-2009, before the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis 
in Greece. We then create dummy variables equal to one whenever the value of 
the respective balance sheet variable is below the sample median (in the case of 
26 Total assets and loan-to-deposit ratio are also available in IBSI, but to assure consistency between the different 
bank characteristics, we categorize banks according to the different balance sheet items as provided by Bankscope. 
Table 7—Moral Suasion: Mechanisms across Domestic Banks
ΔDomestic sovereign bonds
State owned
(dummy)
State owned 
(continuous) Supported
Affiliation 
of executive 
board
Affiliation of
supervisory 
board
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Distinguishing across political connections
High risk ×  High need
  ×  Bank type
−0.035 −0.079 0.065 −0.146 −0.063
(0.027) (0.053) (0.037) (0.086) (0.042)
High risk ×  Bank type 0.034 0.059 −0.057 0.095 0.062
(0.022) (0.041) (0.026) (0.042) (0.109)
High need ×  Bank type 0.040 0.082 −0.017 0.071 −0.013
(0.018) (0.031) (0.024) (0.073) (0.111)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country ×  Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.14 0.13
Number of banks 46 46 46 18 18
Observations 1,961 1,961 1,961 715 715
ΔDomestic sovereign bonds
Low  
log(Assets)
Low tier 
1/Assets
Low tier 
1 + 2/
Assets
Low liquid 
assets/
Assets 
High Loans/ 
Deposits 
High 
NPLs/ 
Assets 
High domestic 
sovereign 
bonds/Assets 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel B. Distinguishing across bank health
High risk ×  High need 0.066 0.072 0.049 0.055 −0.027 −0.016 0.042
  ×  Bank type (0.026) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.038) (0.032) (0.036)
High risk ×  Bank type −0.014 −0.058 −0.045 −0.034 0.026 0.037 −0.075
(0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)
High need ×  Bank type −0.048 −0.055 −0.025 −0.039 0.032 0.003 −0.009
(0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.023)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country ×  Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Number of banks 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
Observations 1,916 1,916 1,916 1,916 1,916 1,916 1,916
(continued )
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assets, Tier 1 capital, Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital, and liquid assets) or above the sample 
median (in the case of loans to deposits, NPLs, and sovereign bond holdings), and 
to zero otherwise. Therefore, in each case, a value of one corresponds to a weaker 
bank that can plausibly face a higher recapitalization need in the future or is more 
vulnerable to an increase in its funding costs, but may not necessarily be assured of 
future government assistance (given, for example, its small asset size).
We then replicate model (1), entering each of the above dummies one at a time in 
the place of  Domestic ij , in the sample of domestic banks. We test the “political con-
nection” mechanism in panel A of Table 7. We first compare state-owned banks to 
private domestic banks during high-need versus low-need months, in terms of their 
propensity to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds. The data suggest 
that state-owned banks are statistically not more likely to do so. Whether we mea-
sure state ownership as a dummy (column 1) or as a continuous variable (column 2) 
does not make a difference.
Table 7—Moral Suasion: Mechanisms across Domestic Banks (continued)
ΔDomestic sovereign bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel C. Horse race
High risk ×  High need ×  Supported 0.075 0.047 0.055 0.065 0.062
(0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.038)
High risk ×  High need  ×  Low log(Assets) 0.077 0.054
(0.027) (0.032)
High risk ×  High need  ×  Low Tier 1/Assets 0.063 0.043
(0.036) (0.033)
High risk ×  High need  ×  Low Tier 1 + 2/Assets 0.039 0.007
(0.035) (0.037)
High risk ×  High need  ×  Low liquid assets/Assets 0.057 0.028
(0.033) (0.036)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country ×  Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Number of banks 46 46 46 46 46
Observations 1,916 1,916 1,916 1,916 1,916
Notes: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the propensity of banks to purchase sovereign 
bonds issued by the domestic government. The sample includes 46 domestic banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain. The sample period is January 2009–September 2012. The dependent variable is the ratio of 
the bank’s net flow of securities issued by the domestic sovereign at time t to the bank’s total holdings of securities 
issued by the domestic sovereign at time t − 1. “High risk” is a dummy variable equal to 1 in all the months after 
the country’s average CDS spread breaches permanently 300 basis points (i.e., January 2010 for Greece, May 2010 
for Portugal, September 2010 for Ireland, August 2011 for Spain, and September 2011 for Italy). “High need ” is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the amount of maturing domestic sovereign bonds in a particular month is above 
the country-specific median for the sample period. In panel A, “Bank type” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
bank is state-owned (column 1); the share of bank equity held by the government or by public entities (column 2); 
a dummy equal to 1 if the bank received government support during the financial crisis of 2008–2009 (column 3); 
the share of the bank’s executive board that is politically affiliated with the federal government (column 4); and 
the share of the bank’s supervisory board that is politically affiliated with the federal government (column 5). In 
panel B, “Bank type” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if in 2009, the bank had below-sample-median assets (column 
1); a below-sample-median ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets (column 2); a below-sample-median ratio of Tier 
1 + Tier 2 capital to total assets (column 3); a below-sample-median ratio of liquid assets to total assets (column 
4); an above-sample-median ratio of loans to deposits (column 5); an above-sample-median ratio of nonperforming 
loans to total assets (column 6); and an above-sample-median ratio of domestic sovereign securities to total assets 
(column 7). All regressions include the rest of the bank-specific variables from Table 2, as well as fixed effects as 
specified. Standard errors clustered at the bank level appear in parentheses.
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However, when we compare supported to nonsupported domestic banks, we find 
that the former are strictly more likely to purchase domestic sovereign bonds during 
high-need months compared to private banks that did not receive government sup-
port during the crisis (column 3). This exercise partially explains the null result in 
columns 1 and 2, which is plausibly driven by the fact that privately owned sup-
ported banks are likely to face pressure from the government, too. Furthermore, 
we find that the extent of political affiliation of neither the bank’s executive board 
(column 4) nor the bank’s supervisory board (column 5) helps explain the “moral 
suasion” effect that we documented in Table 2. The evidence in panel A of Table 7 
thus suggests that while the government’s influence as a result of bank assistance 
during the financial crisis is a perceptible driver of bank behavior consistent with 
“moral suasion,” political connections on their own are not.
The estimates reported in panel B of Table 7 suggest that for a number of empiri-
cal proxies for bank vulnerability, weaker domestic banks are more likely to increase 
their purchases of domestic sovereign bonds during months in which the government 
is facing higher refinancing needs. In particular, this is the case for smaller banks 
(column 1), for less well capitalized banks (columns 2 and 3), and for banks with a 
lower ratio of liquid to total assets (column 4). We do not document any difference 
between the two groups of domestic banks along the dimension of loans to deposits, 
NPLs, or their pre-crisis exposure to domestic sovereign bonds.
Finally, in panel C of Table 7, we run a series of regressions where we juxta-
pose the effect of the bank-specific variables, which turned out to have a significant 
impact on bond buying in panels A and B. We do so by including the dummy for 
whether a bank was supported or not alongside each of the four significant balance 
sheet variables (size, Tier 1, Tier 1 + 2, and the ratio of liquid-to-total assets), first 
adding them one at a time (columns 1– 4) and then in a horse race (column 5). The 
evidence strongly supports the notion that both political pressure through govern-
ment support and balance sheet weakness are a first-order determinant of banks’ 
willingness to accommodate the domestic government’s financing needs. Therefore, 
the “moral suasion” motive is not exhibited by all domestic banks equally, but is 
only present for those domestic banks that received government assistance in the 
past, or are weak and thus plausibly hope to benefit from government assistance in 
the future. At the same time, the governance of banks played less of a role.
V. Aggregate Effect and Duration
Our results raise two broad questions regarding the aggregate economic effect 
and the duration of the effect. The first question asks how much additional balance 
sheet risk a domestic bank is taking on because of the moral suasion mechanism 
that we documented. The triple interaction parameter and the double interaction 
parameter in Table 2, column 3, allow us to perform a back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tion in order to determine the estimated increase in the stock of domestic sovereign 
debt due to moral suasion, relative to the increase in the stock of domestic sovereign 
debt due to risk shifting. As 49 percent of the months during the crisis period are 
high-need months, and as only the risk-shifting channel is operational during both 
high- and low-need months, the coefficient on the triple interaction suggests that on 
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average, the propensity to increase the holdings of domestic sovereign bonds rela-
tive to total assets due to moral suasion was higher by 0.035 (the parameter estimate 
0.071 divided by two). The coefficient on the double interaction implies that on 
average, the propensity to increase the holdings of domestic sovereign bonds rela-
tive to total assets due to risk shifting was higher by 0.049. The two forces combined 
give a propensity that domestic banks increase their holdings of domestic sovereign 
bonds relative to total assets during the high-risk period by 0.084 on a month-on-
month basis.
The average (domestic) bank in the sample spends 18.6 months in a stress period, 
and so its holdings of domestic sovereign bonds relative to total assets increase by 
156 percent, out of which 65 percent is due to moral suasion and 91 percent due 
to risk shifting. This corresponds to the holdings of domestic sovereign bonds, as 
a share of total assets, by the median GIIPS bank in the sample increasing from 
3.8 percent to 6.3 percent due to moral suasion. Alternatively, at the beginning of 
the stress period, the average bank in our GIIPS sample held €3.9 billion worth of 
domestic sovereign bonds, and so the 46 domestic banks in our dataset held collec-
tively €179.4 billion worth of domestic sovereign bonds. Our point estimates imply 
that their overall holdings of domestic sovereign bonds increased by €116.6 billion 
due to moral suasion. Clearly, these estimates understate the aggregate effects of 
moral suasion on domestic sovereign bond holdings because the banks in our sam-
ple account for about 70 percent of the overall domestic market.
The second question asks how persistent the moral suasion effect is. Ex ante 
one would expect the moral suasion effect to subside quickly after the sovereign 
stress disappears. After all, governments only need to pressure their banks when 
they face the risk of an undersubscribed government bond auction. One would 
therefore expect the effect to disappear quickly after the announcement of the 
OMT Program. In addition, testing the persistence of the moral suasion effect 
is also complicated by the fact that other factors came into play in the period 
after Draghi’s speech and the OMT announcement that affected banks’ incen-
tives to buy domestic sovereign debt. For example, as shown by Fiordelisi, Ricci, 
and Stentella Lopes (2017), the Asset Quality Review and the establishment of 
the SSM and the Banking Union incentivized European banks, including GIIPS 
banks, to buy more (domestic) sovereign debt in order to window-dress their bal-
ance sheet ahead of the review. As these programs were already announced at the 
end of 2012, it is hard to say what drives banks’ holding of sovereign debt after 
the OMT announcement.
However, to offer some indication as to whether the moral suasion effect per-
sists, Table 8 reports the estimates from an additional test whereby we extend the 
sample period to June 2013, and include in our main model an additional triple 
interaction of  Domestic with  High need and a  Post-OMT dummy, which is equal 
to 1 after September 2012, and to 0 otherwise. We find that while the crisis period 
exhibits a strong moral suasion pattern, both relative to the pre-crisis and relative 
to the post-crisis period, there is no difference in the behavior of domestic and of 
foreign banks, in high- versus low-need months after the announcement of the OMT 
program. Our results thus suggest that as expected, the effects we record are not 
permanent and that this type of behavior ceases once sovereign risk declines.
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VI. Conclusion
Using a novel identification strategy in combination with a unique new high-fre-
quency dataset of monthly securities holdings by 60 banks in Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, we show that during the European sovereign debt crisis, 
domestic banks—and in particular, banks that received government support during 
the financial crisis and banks that might need (but are not assured) to receive it in the 
future—were considerably more likely than foreign banks to increase their holdings 
of domestic sovereign debt in months when their government needed to roll over a 
large amount of maturing debt. These findings show that governments sway their 
domestic banks to buy domestic sovereign bonds during periods when the supply of 
such bonds exceeds the demand for them (moral suasion).
Our results inform the policy debate surrounding the “deadly embrace” between 
sovereigns and banks. First, our findings show that banks and sovereigns can and do 
collude in times of fiscal stress. This can help stabilize the system at a moment when 
many other players (i.e., foreign banks and insurance companies, asset managers, 
money market funds, etc.) are retreating from the market. That is, domestic banks 
can and do act as a “buyers of last resort” for their sovereigns’ debt, reducing fiscal 
Table 8—Moral Suasion: Duration Analysis
ΔDomestic sovereign bonds
High risk × High need  × Domestic 0.056
(0.031)
High risk  × Domestic 0.052
(0.024)
High need  × Domestic −0.009
(0.022)
Post-OMT  × High need  × Domestic −0.010
(0.026)
Post-OMT  × Domestic 0.032
(0.030)
Bank controls Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes
Country  × Month fixed effects Yes
R2 0.18
Number of banks 60
Observations 2,999
Notes: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the propensity of banks to purchase sovereign 
bonds issued by the domestic government. The sample includes 46 domestic and 14 foreign banks in Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The sample period is January 2009–June 2013. All variables are observed with 
monthly frequency. The dependent variable is the ratio of the bank’s net flow of securities issued by the domestic 
sovereign at time t to the bank’s total holdings of securities issued by the domestic sovereign at time t − 1. “High 
risk” is a dummy variable equal to 1 in all the months after the country’s average CDS spread breaches perma-
nently 300 basis points (i.e., January 2010 for Greece, May 2010 for Portugal, September 2010 for Ireland, August 
2011 for Spain, and September 2011 for Italy). “High need ” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the amount of matur-
ing domestic sovereign bonds in a particular month is above the country-specific median for the sample period. 
“ Post-OMT ” is a dummy variable equal to 1 after September 2012. “Domestic” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the bank is domestically owned. All regressions include the rest of the bank-specific variables from Table 2, as well 
as fixed effects as specified. Standard errors clustered at the bank level appear in parentheses.
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stress by stabilizing yields and spreads. This is especially beneficial when markets 
are overreacting as it lowers the risk of self-confirming expectations.
However, this comes at a cost, as it reinforces the link between banks and their 
sovereigns in a period when sovereign bond spreads are already high. This increases 
the risk on the banks’ balance sheets, which in turn heightens systemic risk. To 
reduce this risk, some change in regulation is warranted. An obvious first step is to 
reduce the chance that banks need to be bailed out by their governments. To this 
end, the introduction of higher capital ratios and the establishment of the European 
Banking Union with a common supervision and resolution system are important 
steps forward to break the sovereign bank “doom loop” and reduce the scope for 
moral suasion.
At the same time, as long as governments rely to a large extent on domestic 
banks for financing and banks have clear incentives to purchase sovereign debt 
for its favorable credit and liquidity characteristics and its use as collateral, com-
mon supervision and resolution will not be enough to break the sovereign-bank 
“doom loop.” Therefore, to reduce the potential disruptive effect of large holdings of 
(domestic) sovereign debt on banks’ balance sheets, a number of proposals for regu-
latory reform, which can complement the Banking Union, have been put forward.27 
These include introducing a positive risk weight on sovereign debt and/or applying 
large exposure limits similar to those on holdings of other asset classes. These regu-
latory reforms should enhance banks’ incentives to take sovereign risk into account 
and limit systemic risk at an EU-wide level, while at the same time allow banks to 
continue playing their market-maker and stabilizing roles in sovereign debt markets. 
Furthermore, the issuance of European Safe Bonds, as envisioned by Brunnermeier 
et al. (2017), could play a role to the extent that their issuance would correspond 
adequately enough in time and volume with high funding needs in  crisis-hit coun-
tries. We leave the further exploration of their role to future research.
27 See for example, ESRB report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures (March 2015) or Viral 
Acharya on the “Banking Union in Europe and other reforms,” VoxEU, October 16, 2012.
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Appendix
Appendix Table A1—Variables: Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source
Bank-level variables, all banks
Domestic Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is domestically owned, 
and to 0 otherwise.
CvH
ΔDomestic sovereign bonds The ratio of the bank’s net flow of sovereign bonds issued by 
the domestic government at time t to the bank’s total holdings 
of sovereign bonds issued by the domestic government at time 
t − 1.
IBSI
Δ Foreign sovereign bonds The ratio of the bank’s net flow of sovereign bonds issued by 
foreign governments at time t to the bank’s total holdings of 
sovereign bonds issued by foreign governments at time t − 1.
IBSI
Δ Private securities The ratio of the bank’s net flow of securities issued by the  
private sector at time t to the bank’s total holdings of  
securities issued by the private sector at time t − 1.
IBSI
Assets (millions) The bank’s total assets, in million euro. IBSI
Deposits/Assets The ratio of the bank’s total deposits to total assets. IBSI
Loans/Deposits The ratio of the bank’s total loans issued to total assets. IBSI
Capital/Assets The ratio of the bank’s equity to total assets. IBSI
Domestic sovereign bonds/Assets The ratio of the bank’s holdings of sovereign bonds issued by 
the domestic government to total assets.
IBSI
Bank CDS The bank’s CDS spread. Bloomberg
Bank-level variables, domestic banks
State owned Dummy variable equal to 1 if a domestic bank is state owned, 
and to 0 otherwise.
CvH
Supported Dummy variable equal to 1 if a domestic bank received gov-
ernment support during the financial crisis, and to 0 otherwise.
CvH
State owned or supported Dummy variable equal to 1 if a domestic bank is state owned 
or received government support during the financial crisis, and 
to 0 otherwise.
CvH
Share affiliated executive board The share of the executive board of a domestic bank that is 
politically affiliated with the federal government.
Boardex
Share affiliated supervisory board The share of the supervisory board of a domestic bank that is 
politically affiliated with the federal government.
Boardex
Primary dealer Dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is a designated primary 
dealer in government bond auctions, and to 0 otherwise.
MFs, EPDH
log(Assets) (2009) Logarithm of the bank’s total assets in 2009. Bankscope
Tier 1/Assets (2009) The ratio of the bank’s Tier 1 capital to total assets in 2009. Bankscope
Tier 1 + 2/Assets (2009) The ratio of the bank’s Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to total assets 
in 2009.
Bankscope
Liquid assets/Assets (2009) The ratio of the bank’s liquid assets to total assets in 2009. Bankscope
Loans/Deposits (2009) The ratio of the bank’s loans to deposits in 2009. Bankscope
NPLs/Assets (2009) The ratio of the bank’s nonperforming loans to assets 
in 2009.
Bankscope
Domestic sovereign 
 bonds/Assets (2009)
The ratio of the bank’s holdings of sovereign bonds issued by 
the domestic government to total assets in 2009.
IBSI
Country-level variables
Sovereign CDS spread The CDS spread on the country’s 10-year sovereign bonds in 
a month.
Bloomberg
Δ Business sentiment index The month-on-month change in the country’s indicator of 
business sentiment reported by the European Commission.
EC
Maturing debt (millions) The amount of existing government debt that is maturing in 
a month.
CSDB
Auctioned debt (millions) The amount of newly issued government debt in a month. CSDB
10-year bond yield spread The difference between the yield on a 10-year spread in a 
particular country and the yield on a German bund in a month.
Bloomberg
Notes: “CvH” is Claessens and van Horen (2015). “IBSI” is the ECB’s Individual Balance Sheet Statistics Dataset. 
“MFs” is Ministries of Finance. “EPDH” is the European Primary Dealers Handbook. “EC” is the European 
Commission. “CSDB” is the ECB’s Centralized Securities Database. 
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